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Abstract—Cognitive Radio plays a major part in 
communication technology by resolving the shortage of the 
spectrum through usage of dynamic spectrum access and 
artificial intelligence characteristics. The element of spectrum 
sharing in cognitive radio is a fundamental approach in utilising 
free channels. Cooperatively communicating cognitive radio 
devices use the common control channel of the cognitive radio 
medium access control to achieve spectrum sharing. Thus, the 
common control channel and consequently spectrum sharing 
security are vital to ensuring security in the subsequent data 
communication among cognitive radio nodes. In addition to well 
known security problems in wireless networks, cognitive radio 
networks introduce new classes of security threats and 
challenges, such as licensed user emulation attacks in spectrum 
sensing and misbehaviours in the common control channel 
transactions, which degrade the overall network operation and 
performance. This review paper briefly presents the known 
threats and attacks in wireless networks before it looks into the 
concept of cognitive radio and its main functionality. The paper 
then mainly focuses on spectrum sharing security and its related 
challenges. Since spectrum sharing is enabled through usage of 
the common control channel, more attention is paid to the 
security of the common control channel by looking into its 
security threats as well as protection and detection mechanisms. 
Finally, the pros and cons as well as the comparisons of different 
CR-specific security mechanisms are presented with some open 
research issues and challenges. 
Keywords—Dynamic Spectrum Access; Spectrum Sharing; 
Common Control Channel; Cognitive Radio Networks 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Cognitive Radio (CR) [1] technology promises to 
intelligently solve the issues in conventional wireless 
technology related to their limited and under-utilised spectrum 
[2]. This problem has become an issue of great concern given 
the continued increase in wireless devices that use unlicensed 
bands to operate, which has resulted in overcrowding, leading 
to inefficient use of the spectrum [3-5]. Therefore, CR provides 
a resolution to spectrum inefficiency and the shortage on these 
bands by allowing CR users (secondary users (SUs)) to 
opportunistically access vacant spectrum space [6]. This results 
in providing great opportunities for a rising number of SUs to 
use these bands through an optimised approach for utilising 
radio resources [7-8].   
radio networks’ (CRN) technology has its own intrinsic 
fundamental approach and principles for dynamic operation 
within the environment, unlike in the conventional wireless 
approach, which is based on the static radio frequency 
spectrum with fixed licensed users (primary users (PUs)) and 
fixed channels [9]. This indicates that the cognitive ability and 
reconfiguration capability are the core elements that make CR 
an advanced technology, which grants dynamic access to the 
unused spectrum for both licensed and unlicensed users 
through certain characteristics: adoption, awareness, 
modification, capability of learning, observation, and 
communication in realistic environments [10-16]. These 
characteristics provide reliable communication among CR 
users anytime and anywhere as a smart and intelligent choice to 
operate dynamically through artificial intelligence algorithms, 
such as spectrum sensing, spectrum sharing, and spectrum 
mobility [13, 17]. Moreover, they differentiate this new CR 
technology from existing wireless technologies. Due to these 
sophisticated features, the CR approach is known as Dynamic 
Spectrum Access (DSA) or Dynamic Spectrum Management 
(DSM) [8,18], in recognition of the potential to realise 
dynamically different paradigms within a network.   
However, generally DSA is considered a big challenge to 
implement because of its dynamic behaviour and nature, such 
as different frequency, geographical location, and time of 
operation [19-20]. Also, SUs might utilise the licensed 
spectrum and encounter PUs who have diverse transmission 
characteristics. Moreover, in comparison to known security 
issues that exist in wireless networks, CRNs are more exposed 
to threats from targeted, intelligent malicious strategies [21-
22]. This poses security challenges in preventing any definite 
or predictable risks from occurring.  
As long as spectrum sharing is one of the fundamental 
aspects of the CR to provide access channels and sharing 
resources, this overview paper mainly focuses on the spectrum 
sharing security of the cognitive radio MAC layer. So far, most 
of the literature focuses on general aspects of CRNs security in 
spectrum sensing and spectrum mobility-related areas. But the 
security of spectrum sharing has received very little research 
coverage. It is very important to conduct thorough research to 
gain a broader and clearer overview of its techniques and 
security-related issues.  
Therefore, this overview paper firstly provides details about 
the spectrum sharing classification, to show the differences of 
the mechanism, operation, and techniques. Subsequently, it 
focuses and gives detailed insights into the threats and attacks 
that are launched in the common control channel (spectrum 
sharing) part of MAC layer of CRNs. In addition, it 
investigates and includes the recent techniques that have been 
developed in this area in terms of protection and detection. 
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 This paper is organised as follows: Section 2 briefly 
demonstrates the CR main functions and section 3 looks into 
the security challenges in cognitive radio’s core functions, 
especially in spectrum sharing, i.e. common control channel 
security. Section 4 discusses common security threats to both 
traditional wireless and cognitive radio networks. It then 
concludes by outlining security threats specific to CR 
networks. Section 5 introduces the existing security methods 
for achieving secure communications in both centralised and ad 
hoc CRNs. Section 6 identifies some open research issues and 
challenges before the paper is concluded in section 7.  
II. COGNITIVE RADIO CORE FUNCTIONS 
There are four fundamental functions which the CRN 
device must perform, as shown in Figure 1 and as stated below 
[8, 23]  
1) Spectrum sensing identifies the parts of the accessible 
spectrum and senses the presence of the PU operating in the 
licensed band. 
2) Spectrum management determines the best channel to 
establish communication. 
3) Spectrum sharing sets up a coordination access among 
users on the selected channel. 
4) Spectrum mobility vacates the channel in case the PU 
is detected. 
One failure can easily affect and result in deterioration of 
the communication or introduce vulnerabilities to the network. 
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Fig. 1. Cognitive radio main functions 
These embedded functions have a strong relationship 
between them for the process of establishing an efficient 
communication, considering the regulations and policies that 
govern CRNs. Each function influences another one by 
providing the necessary information required during the 
process of reaching a final decision. For instance, once the 
spectrum is sensed, in order to identify the available point of 
access, there are two possible decisions that can be taken: If the 
PU is detected then the process will be discontinued; if they are 
not, the obtained information will move forward to the next 
stage. The spectrum management function then decides and 
selects the proper channel for the communication. Once the 
channel is chosen, users are directed to access it by providing 
their information. During a successful communication, 
spectrum mobility remains ready for any changes that resulted 
from the appearance of a PU by a regular check of the spectrum 
sensing, or from other alterations to the environment in terms 
of the current allocation that is provided by spectrum 
management and spectrum-sharing elements [8, 24]. 
As long as CRNs have a set of nodes that interact with each 
other using determined policies, regulations, and sophisticated 
protocols [25], they have different capabilities [22, 26] relating 
to the spectrum awareness of the network operation and 
spectrum context, defined regulations and policies, quality of 
service (QoS), and user requirements for requesting traffic load 
capacity, resilience, and security. This means that cognitive 
nodes are able to dynamically reconfigure themselves 
according to the current environment in order to transmit and 
receive on different frequencies, in addition to supporting a 
variety of transmission access technology schemas [2, 27]. 
Another capability is resource management, which plays an 
important role in collaborating to assign the vacant network 
spectrum management resources, whether these are internal to 
the current network or external to conventional wireless 
networks [8, 28]. 
Spectrum sharing generally can be classified into three 
major criteria, based on the network architecture, access 
technology, and allocation behaviour (Figure 2). Descriptions 
of these classifications as follows: 
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Fig. 2. Spectrum sharing classfications 
The first technique is based on the network architecture, 
whether it is a centralised or distributed system (Figure 3). In 
centralised networks such as IEEE 802.22 cognitive radio, a 
base station governs and senses the free channel information 
from neighbours’ nodes within range and performs the final 
decision on the availability of a channel. Unlike ad hoc CR 
networks, CR nodes generate and utilise a common spectrum 
allocation for the information exchange about available 
channels [8, 22]. Even though the centralised entity has the 
advantages of addressing better efficiency, the main drawback 
is that a single point of failure can be easily launched to the 
central entity [8]. More classifications can be added to ad hoc 
networks, classifying them into static and mobile networks. 
These apply in wireless sensor networks as a static form and in 
MANET (Mobile Ad-hoc Network) as mobile ad hoc networks 
in which a set of autonomous mobile terminals are liberated to 
move to other existing hybrid networks [29, 30] (more details 
about comparing the spectrum sharing mechanisms in both 
centralised and distributed architectures are discussed in [31]). 
The second technique is based on allocation behaviour, 
whether it is cooperative or uncooperative. In the cooperative 
method, CR users are responsible for coordinating the 
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functionalities of the cognitive network in order to ensure the 
optimisation of the spectrum utilisation and improving network 
efficiency through the exchange of information. However, in 
non-cooperative systems, CR users are not responsible for 
coordinating the cognitive functionalities with other cognitive 
devices. Instead, they implement these functions on their own 
[24, 32]. The main difference between these two methods is 
relatively clear: the first approach essentially requires the 
exchange of information; hence a common control channel 
(CCC) is required to facilitate the information exchange. 
However, in the second approach, the cognitive nodes do the 
network functions tasks on their own without the need for any 
collaboration from other cognitive users. This would make the 
task more challenging and difficult for a cognitive user. In 
addition, this can affect the performance due to reasons like 
lower efficiency, slower sharing of spectrum resources 
allocation, and less reliability than the cooperative technique 
[8, 16, 24, 33]. 
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Fig. 3. Cognitive radio architecture 
The last classification is access technology, whether it is an 
overlay or underlay approach [22, 24, 26, 34]. In the overlay 
approach a SU utilises the spectrum without sharing with a PU. 
This is in contrast to the underlay approach, in which both PUs 
and SUs utilise the licensed spectrum at the same time [35-38], 
with strict power control implemented by the CR users not to 
interfere with the PUs. 
III. SECURITY CALLENGES IN CRN CORE FUNCTIONS 
Due to the key differences in their specifications when 
compared to traditional wireless networks, cognitive radio 
networks face certain unique challenges in terms of their 
continued effective use and their vulnerability to outside attack. 
These particular characteristics of CRNs involve the need for 
additional implementation of specific functions, such as proper 
sensing protocols, correct decision making, appropriate 
switching, and the provision of sufficient access for the sharing 
of the resources required to operate each particular function. 
These challenges can be classified into four main areas, which 
will be described in greater detail in the following subsections: 
A. Spectrum Challemges in Spectrum Sensing 
The fact that spectrum sensing is responsible for sensing 
channels and the provision of accurate results means that CRNs 
must overcome certain specific challenges. The challenges 
broadly pertain to the ways in which a cognitive user detects 
and differentiates between PUs and SUs. This is of great 
importance as attackers may be able to emulate the signals of 
the PUs, thereby increasing the likelihood of false alarms being 
triggered. In addition, the hidden node problem may be another 
issue that can lead to a failure to detect the PUs, which would 
result in unacceptable shadow fading [6, 39]. 
B. Spectrum Challenges in Spectrum Management 
An incorrect decision made by the spectrum management is 
a significant issue that could arise relatively easily. Also, the 
inherent complexity of the protection techniques is a key 
requirement to providing reliable and secure transmission of 
information among users. It is possible for an attacker to easily 
forge or tamper with the transmitted information, which would 
affect the correctness of any decisions made by the spectrum 
management. 
C. Security Challenges in Spectrum Mobility 
The requirement for a seamless handoff from one channel 
to another also constitutes a significant challenge for cognitive 
users when an attacker launches a threat to hinder or prevent 
this integral and flawless switching by occupying the available 
channels. This kind of attack could potentially increase the 
waiting time involved in achieving a proper handoff. This 
increase is certainly unacceptable to the PUs, who wants to 
utilise their assigned channels. 
D. Security Challenges in Spectrum Sharing 
The dynamic environment in MANET network architecture 
leads to more challenges and security issues arising due to the 
lack of the central entity which usually provides security and 
key management among users [40]. The control channels 
selection in decentralised cognitive radio networks decreases 
the probability of successful communication among SUs due to 
authenticity and validity. As discussed in [11], SUs are the non-
licensed users and attackers easily exploit them and by 
escalating their privileges, they might damage the spectrum and 
the traffic of the PUs as well. Moreover, without security, this 
issue becomes more critical when cognitive nodes use the 
spectrums only when PUs are not available or not using their 
licensed bands. Moreover, selecting data channel(s) for 
exchange of data among SUs without the authenticity of the 
SUs is another issue that needs to be addressed in CRNs, 
especially for maintaining the links if a PU returns to the 
licensed channel. 
Much research has been conducted into developing security 
in centralised CRNs [1-3]. However, the issue is that no 
research has been carried out on addressing the authentication 
in decentralised CRNs and its requirements, especially 
providing authentication of confidentiality, non-repudiation, 
and integrity, which are considered the main security elements 
in cognitive radio technology. 
IV. SECURITY THREATS 
Although cognitive radio is similar to the traditional 
wireless network, using a wireless medium instead of a wire to 
transmit information, it faces different vulnerabilities, which 
has resulted in the discarding of the communication process 
among end users [41-42]. These vulnerabilities can leads to 
varied threats, which can be classified into two different 
categories: the first relates to common security threats in both 
conventional wireless and CR networks, and the second 
category is specific to CRN users. 
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A. Common Security Threats in Conventional Wireless and 
CR Networks 
In traditional wireless technology, radio channels are used 
to establish communication and transmit information between 
communicating nodes and access points (APs) or base stations 
(BSs). They are used in cognitive networks to address several 
similar functionalities. The transmitted information can be 
sensitive, such as the user’s identity, the user’s privacy, 
allocation and signaling information, as well as key 
information. However, an attacker using a range of techniques 
such as eavesdropping, forgery, and masquerading attacks can 
easily intercept the communication during the transmission 
process [9, 13]. An effective security mechanism must be 
applied to protect data transmission from malicious behaviour 
like eavesdropping and information tampering [29]. Therefore, 
as far as data protection is concerned, different security 
measurements can be used for protection, detection, and 
countermeasures based on wireless security protocols such as 
WEP, WPA, and WPA2 in conventional wireless networks and 
EAP, AES, and 3DES in WiMAX. These security protocols are 
designed with encryption levels of different strengths being 
used according to the importance of the information being 
secured. Figure 4 shows the most common threats in both 
traditional wireless and CR networks. 
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Fig. 4. Common security threats in conventional wireless and CR Networks  
1) Fake Attacks 
 In the infrastructures of wireless networks, BSs or APs act 
as central entities that are connected wirelessly to end 
terminals. In order to establish communication, some 
information is exchanged through a radio channel between the 
end terminal device and the central entity. This information 
includes the identity data belonging to the procedures of the 
network control, network services and network access. A 
malicious user can obtain this information by wiretapping and 
then pose as a legitimate user. The purpose of this fake attack is 
a malicious user accesses the network and obtaining a network 
service or to launch an attack against the network [13, 43-44]. 
Therefore, cryptographic encryption schemes are generally 
used to protect the transmitted messages. 
2) Information Tampering 
This is a serious attack that causes change, modification, 
replacement, or deletion of the information before it is received 
at its intended destination [43], and that result in misleading the 
receiver, who can thus make a wrong decision. Alteration 
significantly affects message integrity, which is unacceptable 
for legitimate users and network policies. However, this type of 
attack generally occurs in a situation where a cooperative 
terminal is needed to forward the information [13, 45-46]. 
3) Service Repudiation 
In this attack, when the connection is achieved between two 
nodes, one user denies transmitting their information for two 
reasons: repudiation for the communication service to deny 
usage of the network, which requires payment for the network 
usage, and repudiation for the communication content to refuse 
the transmission of their content. For example, when 
transactions are made in a commercial process, the user refuses 
to pay. To overcome these issues, proof-of-origin evidence can 
be used against a particular individual for sending or receiving 
messages. Identity, authentication, and cryptography 
encryption schemas are presently used to prevent unpredictable 
or hidden issues arising [13, 47]. 
4) Replay Attack 
The key purpose of this attack at the MAC layer is to obtain 
effective information by intercepting and retransmitting the 
same signed information sent to a particular node over a period 
of time in order to build trust with the receiver. This gives an 
advantage to the attacker, granting them access to new useful 
information like user passwords, which then enables 
unauthorised access to resources and control network licenses, 
etc [13, 48-52]. Therefore, in order to overcome this attack, the 
timestamp procedure is recommended because of the message 
validation involved [52]. 
5) Denial of Service and Information Interference 
While electromagnetic waves are essential in order to gain 
wireless information from users, recent advanced hardware 
technologies can involve a higher transmitted power in the 
communication process at the physical layer. It is, therefore, 
possible for an attacker to use this transmitter power to block 
the ordinary transmission and create interference and noise in 
the communication procedure, thereby decreasing the capacity 
of the wireless BS resources and equipment. This can also 
lessen user access through a BS terminal. Therefore, the 
interference of information procedures is likely to have a 
critical social impact [53]. An example of this occurred in 
2001, which the satellite communication service was 
interrupted due to the high power caused by locating a VSAT 
terminal [13, 50]. 
6) Greedy Behaviour Attack 
During the channel negotiation process in both centralised 
and decentralised multi-hop networks, an attacker intends to 
maximise their throughput of using a spectrum through 
manipulating and changing the parameters of the MAC layer 
protocol [54-57]. This is achieved by reporting false 
information regarding the available channel, which causes 
throughput collapse for other users. For instance, in 
decentralised networks, if a greedy user attempts to misbehave 
by starving the neighbouring node, the intermediate user will 
be affected and banned from transmitting its messages [13]. 
7) Malicious and Selfish Behaviour Attacks 
In malicious behaviour, the attacker makes other cognitive 
users to make handoff from the current channel. This generally 
causes degrading of the network performance [29, 41, 57-58]. 
However, in selfish behaviour, the attacker intends to maximise 
their throughput by using a spectrum to disturb the normal 
process [59]. 
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8) Black and Grey Hole Attacks 
Both black and grey hole attacks exist in decentralised 
networks, where an attacker pretends to be the destination 
node. Therefore, a sender can be easily deceived and start 
transmitting packets. The rate of dropping the transmitting 
packets is used to distinguish between these two attacks. In a 
black hole, the malicious user obtains all the transmitted 
packets; however, in the grey behaviour attack, a malicious 
user drops part of these transmitted packets [29, 60-66]. 
B. Specific Security Threats in CR Networks 
Several potentially serious threats to network performance 
which increase spectrum availability to malicious users have 
been highlighted by researchers investigating CRN technology 
[9, 13, 67]. Moreover, due to the unique characteristics of 
CRNs, they are more exposed to security threats which are 
usually not faced by conventional wireless technology. 
Therefore, security mechanisms play an important role in 
maintaining the network that is potentially affected by these 
kinds of threats [13]. Malicious attacks are well known threats 
that target all layers in the CRN [9, 13] with their own 
behaviour, which can affect network performance by attacking 
a particular layer. Some of the main security threats related to 
CRNs are identified in Figure 5. 
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Fig. 5. Specific security threats in CRNs 
1) Security in Spectrum Sensing 
Spectrum sensing is a major aspect of CRNs environments, 
providing the spectrum information about the appearance of the 
PU and the available channels [12, 32-33, 68]. Therefore, it is 
subjected to the most prevalent attacks that bring the network 
performance down by reporting the false results of the PU 
detection. As long as the security in spectrum sensing is 
concerned with controlling the network operation, attackers 
have their own malicious behaviour strategies, focusing instead 
on degrading the network spectrum performance by causing 
collisions or occupying the spectrum. This can result in 
potential security vulnerabilities that enable denial of service 
(DoS) attacks to be launched easily [67]. Thus serious attacks 
can occur at this level of the spectrum, which are called 
primary users interference (PUI) and primary user emulation 
(PUE).  
In PUE, an attacker can simulate a signal that resembles the 
signal of the PU, thereby misleading the SU [2, 12, 18, 58, 69-
73]. In this case, the attacker has a chance to focus on the 
physical layer, pretending to be an authorised user by sending 
CR signals that are similar to PU signals, allowing them to 
deceive other SUs. This increases the availability of spectrum 
to the malicious user. The authors of [6, 41, 74] have proposed 
a simulation technique used by a malicious user, which 
involves a multiple stage attack that demonstrates the general 
influence on the network performance and other special effects 
on the SUs. Additionally, the authors’ experiment results 
showed how the relationship between the performance 
improvements can be associated with the bands’ availability 
and vice versa. However, in PUI, the attacker breaks the rules 
of the CRN mechanism by affecting network performance 
through interfering with PUs within the network. This forces 
the PU to use spectrum with noise and unavailable frequency 
band [13]. This is also called a jamming message attack or lion 
attack, where an attacker transmits high signal power to disturb 
the PUs through TCP connection [9, 41, 43, 75]. 
Several researchers have investigated and proposed 
algorithms to detect malicious behaviours in cooperative 
sensing of the spectrum in order to improve security in this 
stage. A detection scheme based on a past test report obtained 
through calculating the suspected point of secondary users, and 
computing the value of trust behaviour mechanism, is proposed 
in [74]. The proposed algorithm is able to distinguish malicious 
from honest users within a network. However, [76] presented a 
data mining technique without needing priori information about 
a secondary user to detect misbehaviours. In addition, [67] 
explained that changing the spectrum modulation system 
strategy and protecting the location information of the PU, and 
using proactive techniques in transmission, can help to prevent 
DoS attacks at this stage. 
2) Security in Spectrum Management 
Spectrum management is considered to be the second task 
after obtaining the result from spectrum sensing. Once the 
available bands are allocated, spectrum management 
determines the proper spectrum for communications based on 
the desired characteristics for quality of service (QoS) [22]. 
However, this stage cannot be safe from attacks. A forgery 
attack or tampering attack is designed to attack this particular 
level of the network element and involves the attacker 
transmitting incorrect spectrum sensing information to the data 
collection centre in order to deceive the secondary user, 
encouraging the wrong decision from spectrum management, 
which enables the malicious user to utilise the channel with 
superlative adaptive purpose [13, 67]. 
3) Security in Spectrum Mobility 
This stage refers to the mandatory process of seamlessly 
switching (handoff) from a current channel to another available 
one due to channel occupancy by the PU. With the appearance 
of the PU to utilise their assigned channel, a SU must vacate 
and select another available channel to initiate a new 
connection, resulting in greater energy consumption [22, 67, 
77-78].  
However, from a security perspective, the availability of 
spectrum is reduced when there are a large number of 
malicious users, and this limited availability affects other 
legitimate SUs, who are required to vacate the current channel 
due to the appearance of the PU and to select another available 
channel [53, 78]. Moreover, a failed handoff to a proper 
channel may occur when an attacker forces SUs to vacate the 
channel by pretending to be the PU. As a consequence, it 
results in slower communication and requires additional time to 
resume the process of the communication [18, 22, 69]. 
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4) Security in Spectrum Sharing 
As long as spectrum sharing is crucial to maintaining 
effective communication in traditional wireless networks 
through the application of the Medium Access Control (MAC) 
method, it is an area of great interest for a number of 
researchers, who have proposed different solutions for sharing 
the spectrum [80, 81-83]. These solutions include a non-
dedicated common control channel [84], a hopping-based 
control channel [85] and a dedicated CCC, also known as a 
Dynamic Local Common Control Channel (DLCC) [86] 
(Figure 6). These approaches focus on achieving a proper level 
of sharing among cognitive users. In this paper, a brief 
explanation of the first two approaches has been given, while 
the third approach is the main one which is considered in detail. 
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Fig. 6. Specific security threats in CRNs 
a) Non-dedicated CCC 
In this approach, a predefined non-dedicated CCC is 
assumed among a set of SUs. Hence, a number of CRN MAC 
protocols are designed for predicting that a CCC is already 
recognised and allocated to those SUs. Industrial, scientific and 
medical (ISM) or underlay ultra-wideband that is identified as 
unlicensed band can be the appropriate place to implement a 
control channel for cognitive users in order to exchange the 
control information [78, 80, 88]. 
b) Hopping-based Control Channel 
This approach requires a predefined channel hopping 
sequence that is determined among SUs in order to achieve the 
hopping process over the existing licensed channels [87]. Both 
the cognitive sender and receiver necessitate time and channel 
synchronisation [5]. During this process, a proper channel is 
determined to be utilised to transmit data through exchange of 
control information between the sender and the receiver. Once 
successful control information is exchanged between both SUs, 
they end the hopping process and start with the second phase of 
transmitting data. After the completion of the data transmission 
phase, the synchronisation requests are recurred with the 
hopping sequence [23, 80]. 
c) Dynamic Local CCC 
The CCC technique is one of the methods used to facilitate 
the functional sharing process between two SUs in distributed 
cooperative CRNs.  
In distributed cooperative systems, CCC is established 
between both the sender and the receiver for establishing a 
handshaking protocol [14, 54, 80, 82, 84, 90-91]. In addition, 
CCC can be used to communicate with a base station through 
an existing centralised entity system [92]. It is also employed to 
include the related information that has resulted from the 
spectrum sensing. Due to these effective functionalities, a 
number of researchers believe that CCC designed procedures 
can play a major role in promoting the initial exchange of 
information processes among cognitive nodes.  
However, from a security viewpoint, no spectrum sharing 
classifications, which are discussed in section 2, are secure 
against any malicious behaviour while they are not supported 
with security mechanisms for protection and detection (see 
table 1). Generally the attackers’ intention is to determinate an 
effective strategy that exposes a predictable risk. For instance, 
when CCC is used in the cooperative method of decentralised 
CRNs for exchanging information about the available channels 
and the selected channel for data transmission between SUs, it 
is more prone to various attacks based on selfish and malicious 
behaviours [41-42]. Because it is regarded as a valuable 
structure for the attacker to access the channel and gain the 
most sensitive information, a key approach for some types of 
attackers involves applying a PUE attack. Moreover, it is more 
exposed to other attack types such as eavesdropping and DoS, 
which can be launched easily due to existing weaknesses 
within the MAC layer, where poor authentication and an 
existing lack of encryption mechanisms enable an attacker to 
detect available channels that they can occupy to forge or drop 
MAC frames, as shown in Figure 7 [41, 56, 90].  
Fig. 7. Malicious activities in decentralised CRNs 
Another vulnerability in a CCC is where an attacker forges 
the transmitted packets to another path and causes collisions. 
As a consequence, this impedes the network performance and 
launches a DoS attack. Once a CCC is saturated by attackers, a 
large number of forged packets are generated to block the 
exchange of the control information, enabling DoS attacks to 
be easily launched against the network, hence affecting its 
performance.  
Moreover, an author in [56] suggests that encryption must 
be applied between legitimate SUs for the exchange of control 
information; otherwise, it can be readable by attackers of other 
cognitive users. Also, it can protect the exchanged control 
information over the channel from predictable control channel 
hopping sequences, thereby preventing itself from being 
saturated [13, 92]. 
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TABLE I.  OVERVIEW OF THE ATTACKS OCCURRING AT DIFFERENT CR 
FUNCTIONS 
Attack 
Name 
CR 
function 
Description 
Forgery & 
Data tamper 
Spectrum 
Sensing 
Spectrum Management system makes wrong 
decision by receiving the attackers' sensing 
information 
Overlapping 
An attacker impacts other networks by 
transmission to a specific network 
Denial of 
Service 
 
An adversary user decreases the availability 
of the spectrum bandwidth by blocking the 
communication, through creating noise 
spectrum signals which cause interference 
with PUs 
Lion or 
Jamming 
message 
An attacker transmits high signalling power 
to disturb the PU or the secondary user 
which results forcing the cognitive user to 
hop to different channel to utilise 
Spectrum 
Sensing 
Data 
Falsification 
 
In collaborative spectrum sensing, a 
collaboration technique used among CR 
nodes to generate and utilise a common 
spectrum allocation for the exchange of 
information about available channels. 
However adversary node gives false 
observations information to other users. 
Eavesdroppi
ng 
Spectrum 
Sharing 
Weaknesses within the layer due to the poor 
authentication and no existing encryption 
mechanisms 
Denial of 
Service & 
masquerade  
Repetition of the frequent packets that result 
in overcrowding the channel which is being 
busy to be utilised by legitimated users 
Selfish 
Behaviour 
or selfish 
masquerade 
attack 
an attacker does not follow the normal 
communication process for maximising their 
throughput, saving energy or gaining unfair 
beneficial access of using spectrums through 
injecting frequent anomalous behaviour 
Key 
depletion 
An attacker attempts to break the cipher by 
repetition of the session key 
Forgery 
Attack 
Lack of authentication mechanism leads to 
the occurrence of modification and forgery 
on MAC CR Frames which result in the 
launch of DoS attacks 
Biased 
Utility Spectrum 
Manage
ment 
An attacker tries to reduce the bandwidth of 
other SUs in order to obtain more bandwidth 
by changing the spectrum parameters 
False 
feedback 
An attacker secretes the incidence of the PU 
in order to disturb the information sensing of 
other SUs 
 
V. RELTAED WORKS (EXISTING SECURE COMMUNICATION 
SCHEME IN CRNS) 
Since the layers within CRNs have their own characteristics 
and parameters [74, 93], they are vulnerable and allow an 
attacker to make a decision to launch a specific attack for the 
purpose of degrading the whole network performance. In MAC 
layer frames, an adversary has a variety of aims for 
misbehaving and launching such an attack. For instance, a 
denial of the channel service is one of the serious threats that 
lead to the network degradation between both sender and 
receiver. This attack occurs when the attacker saturates the 
CCC till it becomes weak for attacking [8]. In addition, selfish 
behaviour is another example of an attack that can also exist in 
the MAC layer, in which an attacker does not follow the 
normal process of communication. Therefore, in order to 
provide a defence against these threats, security mechanisms 
are required in the MAC layer to provide authentication, 
authorisation and availability (AAA) in the CRNs. 
Incorporating these security features can lead to the exchange 
of complete and reliable secure MAC frames among cognitive 
users [9, 13, 94]. Thus, several studies have been conducted for 
secure MAC protocols in CRNs [11, 14-15, 94-101]. They are 
classified into two categories, based on protection and 
detection techniques for addressing the security requirements 
and to defend the existing security issues in MAC protocols in 
CRNs. 
A. Protection Mechanism in CRNs 
In general, a number of researchers [11, 15, 94-97, 99-100] 
have made efforts to address the security requirements and 
provide secure communication among SUs by applying 
different security mechanisms, such as authentication and 
authorisation access by different techniques, within a CRN. 
Their proposed procedures include digital signatures, 
certification authority (CA), and trust-based third parties 
entities like server and base stations. While these solutions may 
be effective in some ways, they have some drawbacks.  
1) Digital Signature 
In [11, 15, 99] proposed different protection systems based 
on applying a digital signatures for protecting the network from 
DoS attacks and providing secure communication. Their 
approaches involve the activities of a CA, PUs, and both PUs’ 
and SUs’ base stations. However, the main differences of these 
mechanisms are that the BSs are connected to the CA using 
wire links in [15], while in the [99] approach, an asymmetric 
key scheme instead of a CA is mainly used. 
2) Certificate Authority 
Another effective traditional approach-based CA on the 
application layer for achieving the same purpose of 
authentication is presented in [100, 101]. The proposed method 
uses both EAP-TTLS (for establishing a secure connection) 
and EAP-SIM (for authenticating the user) algorithms. 
3) Trust Values Procedures  
Other techniques based on trust values procedures are 
proposed in [95-96] to address and analyse the issues within 
CRNs. Based on this, the trust value will be calculated, which 
leads to the decision that will either allow the current user to 
utilise the available licensed channel or not.  
4) Other Framework Architectures 
Security for authentication and authorisation architecture 
frameworks have been proposed in [94, 97]. Both techniques 
require third-party entities for appropriate access policies to the 
spectrum. Authors in [94] use a technique based on processing 
user identification in the system and providing the user 
preferences to third parties according to privacy rules. Based on 
this, the user will be authenticated and then will determine 
whether or not a data port would be used. However the 
subsequent architecture in [97] consists of two layers, which 
are up-layers for authentication purpose and encryption 
techniques, while the physical layer is for securing and 
protecting the spectrum. 
Overall, while these proposed mechanisms are effective in 
some way for protecting the networks from forgery and DoS 
attacks, they are not applicable in a decentralised environment 
(IJACSA) International Journal of Advanced Computer Science and Applications, 
Vol. 5, No. 1, 2014 
83 | P a g e  
www.ijacsa.thesai.org 
because a third-party node is incorporated in order to verify the 
identity and provide security key managements to end users. 
Therefore, the security and challenges in decentralised CRNs 
still arise and require defensive techniques for securing 
communication among cognitive users. Table 2 demonstrates 
the pros and cons of the proposed protection mechanisms.  
TABLE II.  PROTECTION MECHANISMS IN COGNITIVE RADIO NETWORKS 
Proposed 
Mechanism 
pros/
cons 
Description 
User 
identification 
pro 
Low complexity by generating two virtual ports 
for secure transmission: the first is for control 
traffic information and another is for data 
transmission which is blocked by default unless 
the user has been authenticated. 
con 
It requires a third party to provide information 
like user preferences 
Digital 
signature & 
certificate 
authority 
Pro 
Low complexity and using the basic 
architectures of symmetric and asymmetric key 
infrastructures. 
Con 
It has not been simulated and tested to proof the 
security. It also does not work in Ad-hoc 
environment due to being based on centralised 
entities. 
Certificate 
authority 
 
Pro 
Effective security mechanism due to identifying 
and verifying the user and the server 
respectively. 
Con 
Requires a third-party to verify the user identity. 
Also the mechanism has not been simulated and 
tested to ensure security against malicious 
behaviours. 
Trust values  
Pro 
It is an additional procedure that can be built on 
the top of other security techniques to increase 
the level of the protection and detection in term 
of secure communication. 
Con 
Requires a third party procedure is to provide 
previous information of a node. Moreover, 
when a new node joins the network, the CA will 
not be able to provide reference for that 
particular user. Hence the mechanism does not 
operate in strong fixed level of the 
authentication for all cognitive users equally. 
B. Detection schemes in CRNs 
Authors in [14, 98,102] have focused on the detection 
mechanisms in CRNs. Their proposed techniques address a 
variety of attacks caused by malicious and selfish behaviours, 
and the pros and cons of these mechanisms are illustrated in 
table 3. 
1) Selfish behaviour 
Selfish behaviour detection techniques for the CCC are 
proposed in [14, 103], where a puzzle punishment model is 
applied for bad behaviour activities in a situation where a 
receiver is asked for a new hidden channel that has not been 
included previously. Thus, the sender would be a suspicious 
case. Therefore, the receiver applies the puzzle punishment to 
detect whether the sender is a selfish node or not. If the sender 
node solves the puzzle, they will be considered as a legitimate 
user and communication will be resumed normally; otherwise, 
the communication will be disconnected. Another technique 
called Cooperative neighboring cognitive radio Nodes 
(COOPON) is applied among a group of neighbouring users to 
detect selfish nodes who broadcast fake channel lists. 
Consequently, neighbouring users can detect the selfish users 
by comparing the transmitted channel list of the target user 
with their lists. 
2) Timing parameters 
Another detection mechanism was proposed in [102]. They 
presented a mechanism that relies on timing parameters at 
MAC layer. When the negotiation phase is taking place, the 
node, which receives a request, sets up timing parameters for 
controlling the time interval. This forces the sender to transmit 
data without getting a higher rate. If the sender does not obey 
and sends packets more frequently, the receiver node takes 
action against the sender. Then the receiver node analyses the 
sender’s misbehaviour and broadcasts the information over the 
current network. 
3) Anomalous spectrum usage attacks (ASUAs) 
The others in [98] presented a cross-layer technique for 
CRNs for detecting ASUAs. Collecting the information on both 
the physical and network layers provides an awareness of the 
current spectrum. It operates against the PUE and jamming 
attacks to provide successful access to the spectrum. 
TABLE III.  DETECTION MECHANISMS IN COGNITIVE RADIO NETWORKS 
Proposed 
Mechanism 
pros/co
ns 
Description 
Selfish 
activity 
Pro 
applied in both CCC and data channel which 
decreases the potential of misbehaviour in 
different stages of the network 
Con 
focuses only on detecting selfish behavior and 
does not provide the complete secure 
communication between sender and receiver 
timing 
parameter  
 
Pro 
Detecting misbehaving nodes during the 
negotiation phase. It helps to maintain the 
channel from getting saturated. 
Con 
-Theoretical and has not been simulated and 
tested to provide the detection scheme results.  
-Weak against eavesdropping and forgery 
attacks especially once the FCL is not hidden 
which is exploited to launch Jamming attacks. 
Anomalous 
Spectrum 
Usage 
Attacks  
Pro 
Combining both physical and network layers 
for detecting malicious users give a better 
achievement instead of selecting only a layer 
Con 
Focuses only on the detection approach and 
does not consider a significant protection 
scheme against both jamming and PUE 
attacks mobility. 
 
C. Comparisons of the Presented Schemes 
Incorporating the security requirements; authentication, 
confidentiality, non repudiation and data integrity in CRNs 
can lead to the exchange of complete and reliable secure MAC 
frames among cognitive users [9, 13, 92]. For instance, while 
the proposed digital signature, trust value and certificate 
authority procedures are different in terms of their operations 
(see the protection schemes in section V), the security 
requirements are considered for providing defense against 
most of the MAC threats such as DoS, Forgery, eavesdropping 
and spoofing in centralised CRNs. In contrast, both puzzle 
punishment and COOPON approaches consider only selfish 
behaviour among the other MAC attacks such as DoS, forgery, 
eavesdropping, and spoofing in decentralized CRNs. 
However, they are effective in selfish behaviour's detection 
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due to the cooperation between a group of cognitive users 
which involve identifying selfish users in COOPON technique 
and demand of solving the puzzle to resume the 
communication in puzzle punishment system. Moreover, the 
timing parameter procedure easily addresses DoS attack due to 
the presence of the centralised entity, which controls the 
cognitive users’ communication. Table 4 gives information 
about achieving the security requirements and addressing the 
MAC layer attacks for each proposed scheme in both 
centralised and decentralised CRNs.  
TABLE IV.  COMPARISION OF THE PRPOSED SECURITY SCHEMES IN CRNS 
Authentication 
Eavesdropping 
& Spoofing 
Forgery 
DoS 
Integrity 
Architecture
Selfish 
Non- 
repudiation 
Confidentiality 
Mutual 
Authentic
ation 
Eavesdrop
ping and 
Spoofing 
Forgery 
DoS 
Integrity 
Architectu
re
Selfish 
Non- 
repudiatio
n 
Confidenti
ality 
√
√
√
√
√
Centralised
√
√
Ad-Hoc
√
√
√
√
√
√
Centralised
√
√
Mutual 
Authentic
ation 
Eavesdro
pping and 
Spoofing 
Forgery 
DoS 
Integrity 
Architect
ure
Selfish 
Non- 
repudiati
on 
Confident
iality 
√
Centralised
√
√
√
√
√
Centralised
√
√
Digital 
Signature
Puzzle 
punishment
Trust 
value 
Timing 
parameter 
CA
Ad-Hoc
√
COOPON
 
VI. OPEN RESEARCH AREAS AND CHALLENGES 
As long as secure communication is crucial for the 
exchange of information between SUs, the primary security 
concerns in decentralised CRNs are authentication and data 
confidentiality. Compromising on these elements can 
potentially lead to the modification, forgery or eavesdropping 
of the MAC frames in CR networks, which could, in turn, 
increase the chance of DoS attacks that would adversely affect 
the performance of the network. However, these security 
factors in ad hoc CRNs have received relatively little attention 
in the literature, perhaps due to their complex nature and 
dynamic topology [104]. These must be investigated properly 
in order to meet the security needs of the CRNs’ technology. 
Further research is required in order to support the security 
requirements, especially to provide authentication assurance for 
the authorised access. These requirements assist in maintaining 
secure communication and enable the provision of available 
resources in distributed multi-hop CR environments, while 
simultaneously avoiding external threats. Moreover, a proper 
high-level encryption method is required to support secure 
communication between end users, although due consideration 
should be given to the inherent power limitations of the 
devices. This issue is also important because of the lack of a 
central entity that provides security and key management to 
end users. Thus, the implementation of a secure CR MAC 
protocol must involve the design and implementation of a 
robust, secure system that can achieve authentication, 
availability, confidentiality, integrity, non-repudiation, 
anonymity, and authorisation for granting security demands. 
This is of fundamental importance because CR users need to 
incorporate security by all possible means to ensure the 
protection of the relatively vulnerable network operations. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
Cognitive radio networks are a remarkable area for 
researchers due to their use of intelligent technology for 
providing a solution that utilises the available spectrum 
efficiently. However, security is a crucial aspect of CRNs to 
achieve successful communication between cognitive users. 
Due to some unique characteristics in CRNs, different new 
threats to CR functions exist, such as PUE and PUI in spectrum 
sensing, Tampering attacks in spectrum management, failed 
handoffs in spectrum mobility, and MAC threats like 
eavesdropping, forgery, and selfish behaviour attacks in 
spectrum sharing are other threats. Therefore, CRN is far more 
exposed to security threats than those facing the conventional 
wireless technology. This paper presented a comprehensive 
survey about the challenges and security in CRNs. The 
information is presented as a hierarchical structure, starting 
with challenges and then threats in spectrum sensing, spectrum 
management, and spectrum mobility. A major portion of the 
paper has been dedicated to spectrum sharing because it has 
been the main motivation behind this overview. Moreover, it 
introduced the spectrum sharing mechanisms: Non-dedicated 
CCC, hopping-based control channel and more details about 
the common control channel were chosen for investigation and 
highlighted the potential existing threats and vulnerabilities. 
The paper also highlighted several potentially serious threats to 
network performance in both centralised and ad hoc CRNs. As 
a result, the most recent detection and protection mechanisms 
were discussed in terms of their pros and cons and compared 
for the purpose of addressing the security issues in CRNs. 
Finally, some open research issues and challenges were 
presented, which must be met to ensure secure operation of 
CRNs. 
For future work, a hybrid secure MAC protocol for CRN is 
proposed in [105]. The protocol is analysed and designed for 
addressing the security requirements, such as authentication, 
confidentiality, integrity, and non-repudiation. It also addresses 
most of the security issues in decentralised CRN, such as 
spoofing, eavesdropping, and forgery attacks. Therefore, the 
implementation stage of the proposed protocol is in progress in 
order to provide results that will be compared with others 
belonging to different secure protocols. 
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